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Abstract
This article is the ￿rst attempt to study the empirical link between income
aspirations and cooperation in a one shot public good game. By combining
experimental with survey data, we ￿nd evidence that the more frustrated people
are with their income, the lower is their propensity to cooperate with foreigners
and compatriots. The quantitative e⁄ect is remarkable: participants who are
most frustrated are 46 percent more likely to free-ride on foreigners than those
who are satis￿ed with their income.
JEL classi￿cation numbers: D01, D6, H4, C9
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1This article is the ￿rst attempt to explore the empirical link between two cen-
tral concepts in the social sciences: real income aspirations and cooperation. Taking
advantage of a rich database, the article enquires into what extent people￿ s real life in-
come aspirations explains voluntary contributions to public goods which are provided
at di⁄erent geographical levels (i.e. neighbourhood, country and world).
While the existing literature on social preferences focuses on whether people are
intrinsically cooperative or not, we argue that people may be neither intrinsically
sel￿sh nor altruistic. Instead, their level of cooperation may depend on how satis￿ed
they are with their income aspirations. The intuition is straightforward. When facing
a decision involving a voluntary public good game, people may look at their own
situation and assess their unsatis￿ed income aspirations. The closer (farther) they
￿nd themselves to the income they aspire, the more (less) likely they are to cooperate.
The following example illustrates our point. John is a New York cabdriver who
works for a daily target return. Today, he has committed himself to clean a common
area together with his neighbours. John cannot do both task during the day, so he has
to choose only one. He individually prefers earning his daily target to cooperating
with neighbours, while having the common area cleaned is unanimously preferred
to leaving it as it is. John is better o⁄ when a neighbour cleans than when none
does. Will John cooperate with his neighbours and leave his income aspirations
unsatis￿ed or will he follows his own interest? John is facing a linear public good
game and the answer to the question is trivial for any economist. If John is rational
and sel￿sh he will go for his daily target return.1 If he cares to a su¢ cient extent
about his neighbours he may leave his income aspirations unattained for that day
and cooperate. Similar behaviour can be expected if he cares about reciprocity and
thinks her neighbours have been kind enough to him. So far nothing new in this
example. Now consider a di⁄erent scenario. John is on a rainy and busy day in which
earnings per hour are high. Suppose he is at a point in the day in which he is already
satis￿ed with what he has earned although if he continues working, his earnings can
only be improved further. Would he stop earning money and help her neighbours in
this second scenario? According to the existing literature on human cooperation, the
predictions of an economist in this scenario wouldn￿ t be di⁄erent from the previous
one. The literature assumes that trade-o⁄ between John￿ s and others￿welfare is
independent on John having reached or being close to reaching an aspiration level.
This article challenges this assumption and investigates whether John would be more
likely to cooperate with her neighbours if he were more satis￿ed with his income
1We are assuming that there is no punishment is he does so.
2aspirations. In addition, the article studies whether his behaviour would change if
instead of having to clean a common local area (contribute to generate a local public
good) he had to spend the day cleaning a river that would bene￿t citizens of another
country (contribute to generate a global public good).
To anticipate results to come, this article ￿nds that John (as a representative agent
in our sample) would be more likely to cooperate with compatriots and foreigners the
closer he is to achieve her income aspirations. However, his willingness to cooperate
with his neighbours would seem to be independent on whether his income aspirations
are satis￿ed or not.
We combine experimental data with a post-experiment survey. The experimental
design consists in a Nested Public Good Game (NPGG).2 In a NPGG, individuals
have the option of keeping their endowment for themselves, contributing some of
it to a local pot (L), and/or contributing some of it to a larger pot ￿in this case
representing either a national (N) or global pot (G). In our experiment, participants
play two interactions involving this NPGG, one in which the contribution entails a
choice between the local and national pot (Decision N), and a second in which the
contribution entails a choice between the local and global pots (Decision W). The
local pot is comprised of the participant plus three other participants from the local
area. The national or global pot consists of the participant￿ s local group plus two
other groups of four people from di⁄erent areas of the same country (Decision N), or
from di⁄erent countries around the world (Decision W). A post-experiment survey
collects di⁄erent variables of interest for this article.
1 Related literature
The idea of people satisfying aspirations is not new in economics. On the theoretical
side, Simon (1955) was one of the pioneers in introducing aspirations levels into deci-
sion making3. More recently Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) develops a model that
introduces the probabilities of reaching and not reaching an aspiration level into an ex-
pected utility representation. There is also a theoretical literature on aspiration-based
reinforcement learning that studies the economic implications of adaptive agents who
compare payo⁄s achieved with an aspiration level (Bendor et al., 2001; Selten, 1998)
and a recent literature that studies the relationship between failure of aspirations and
2The design was constructed by Buchan et al. (2009) and it is similar to that employed by
Blackwell and McKee (2003) in Economics and by Wit and Kerr (2002) in Psychology
3See Traub (1999) for a review of aspirations as frames that individuals use to make decisions.
3poverty (Ray, 2006; Heifetz and Minelli, 2006; Dalton and Ghosal, 2007). Theories
based on aspiration levels have been also used to explain phenomena such as the
Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin, 1976, 2001), the merger paradox (Huck et al., 2007)
and the labour supply of New York City cabdrivers (Camerer et al., 1997).
Closer to our work, there is an existing literature relating aspirations with cooper-
ation. While our paper investigate the empirical link between real income aspirations
and individual propensity to cooperate in a one shot game, this previous research
develops theoretical frameworks that introduce adapting aspiration levels to explain
cooperation in repeated interaction games (see Karandikar et al., 1998; Oechssler,
2002; Palomino and Vega-Redondo, 1999).
2 Conceptual Framework
This article argues that a person cares about others when her material needs/aspirations
are su¢ ciently satis￿ed. We ground this idea on a combination of Simon￿ s (1955) the-
ory of satiation and Maslow￿ s (1943) theory of human motivation. Maslow argued
that humans are motivated by unsatis￿ed hierarchical needs:
￿the appearance of one need depends on the prior satisfaction of an-
other, more pre-potent need. [...] No need or drive can be treated as if it
were isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of satisfaction
or dissatisfaction of other drive.￿(Maslow, 1943, pg. 370)
Maslow￿ s theory can be interpreted with economics lenses as follows. Individual
income aspirations correspond to the lower steps of Maslow￿ s pyramid and others￿
welfare as being the upper levels of the pyramid. Preferences ranking depends on
which level of the pyramid agents are. Someone who is seeking to satisfy lower level
needs (e.g. food, water, shelter) may be expected to act "more sel￿shly" than someone
who has overcome her basic needs and is seeking higher social goals in the pyramid,
such as sense of belonging or good relationships. Below we describe a sketch of a
simple framework consistent with our argument.4
Suppose an agent has two-dimensional aspirations levels:
x1 income aspirations to satisfy own material needs and
x2 social aspirations to satisfy concerns regarding others￿needs such as equality,
fairness, social welfare, etc.
4Such a framework goes back to work of Encarnacion Jr (1964).
4The agent decision problem is to maximize x2 subject to x1 ￿ x￿
1, where x￿
1
is the income aspiration level. If this problem has no solution, then the problem
becomes simply to maximize x1. In that way, the individual is supposed to pursue
her aspirations within a system of priorities, where aspirations x1 is superior to x2.
As soon as the satisfactory level of x1 is reached, x2 becomes dominant in the overall
choice situation and x1 becomes a constraint.
Let u1 = u1(x) be a function which orders aspirations x according to the ￿rst
aspirations: x0 ￿ x00 on the basis of aspirations 1 if and only if u1(x0) > u1(x00). Any
other function v1(x) = f[u1(x)] will do the job, provided only that f0 > 0. Let make




i is a particular constraint level of xi. The agent utility function,
which expresses overall preferences among aspirations levels, can then de￿ned in term






For simplicity, let￿ s assume that ui(x) ￿ u￿
i always, so min[ui(x);u￿
i] = ui(x).









The individual compares these two utility vectors lexicographically, and prefer-
ences among alternatives x can be described symbolically as in Encarnacion Jr (1964)
P(x) = L￿[u(x)]; where them L￿-ordering emphasizes the essential roles played by the
satiation levels u￿
i. Given these preferences, x0 ￿ x00 if and only if u1(x0) > u1(x00) or
if u1(x0) = u1(x00); u2(x0) > u2(x00).
3 Method
3.1 Experiment and Survey
Data from a linear public-good experiment was gathered and a survey conducted
in Argentina. The experiment was part of a set of similar experiments conducted
5in six other countries around the world5 under the umbrella of a meta-project on
cooperation and globalization. (Buchan et al., 2009) We only make use of the data
gathered in Argentina, where we included additional relevant questions for this article.
Approximately 200 subjects participated in three public goods experimental de-
cisions6 in ￿xed order. Pilot tests found no ordering e⁄ects. Subjects were drawn
from the general population in Buenos Aires (city and province).7 A quota sampling
recruitment method was used based on gender, age and socioeconomic status.8 The
experimental sessions were conducted in groups of no less than eight and no more
than eighteen participants. Interactions were anonymous, and the groups with which
subjects interacted were randomly selected at the beginning of each decision. No
feedback between decisions was provided. Hence, the three decisions can be treated
as independent.
In each of the two decisions studied here, subjects were given 10 tokens each.9
The task in each decision was to decide how to allocate these 10 tokens among their
￿personal￿account (or private good) and two ￿collective￿accounts (or public good),
whose composition varied across the two decisions. Each token put into the ￿personal￿
account maintained intact its value (i.e. the individual marginal return to the private
good, ￿; was 1). As it is standard in LPGGs, the individual marginal return to
the public good, ￿; is lower than the marginal return to the private good, ￿, but
contributing creates positive externalities for the other people in the group (i.e. ￿ > ￿;
N￿ > ￿; where N is the number of players).
In a ￿rst decision, Decision N, subjects were asked to allocate their endowments
between their "personal" account, a "local" account (or local public good) composed
of the subject and another three anonymous randomly chosen neighbours, and a
"national" account (or national public good). The "national" group was made up
of the subject, the same three "local" people bene￿ting from the "local" account -
plus eight anonymous subjects from other parts of Argentina. Tokens allocated to the
5The experiment was conducted also in Iran, England, Italy, United States, South Africa and
Russia.
6Participants￿play three Linear Public Good Games (LPGG) or Voluntary Contributions to a
Public Good Game. For the purpose of this paper, we are going to focus only on two of the three
decisions played, simply because this two decisions have exactly the same structure of incentives and
only di⁄er in the identity of the recipients of the public good.
7The locations chosen were Almagro, Boedo, Caseros, San Isidro and Las Flores. Approximately
50 subjects were recruited per location. Subjects recruitment was carried out by the CINEA, an
argentine agency specialised in survey polls and market research.
8Gender (male, female), age (18-30, 31-50, 51-70) and socio-economic status (low, medium, high).
The administration of the experiment was oral and paper-based.
9One token was worth the purchasing power equivalent of US $0.50
6"personal" account were saved for the individual (￿ = 1). Tokens placed in the "local"
account were summed up, and the total was doubled and shared equally between the
four individuals of the "local" group. Tokens placed in the "national" account were
instead tripled by the experimenter and divided equally among the 12 people of the
"national" group. Thus, the marginal return of one token allocated to the "local"
account was ￿
L = 0:5 =
(1￿2)
4 ; and to the "national" account was ￿
N = 0:25 =
(1￿3)
12 .
Therefore, the payo⁄ for individual i in decision N was:
￿
N
i (xi;G) = ￿xi + ￿G = ￿(10 ￿ g
L+N











where xi 2 [0;10] is the number of tokens that player i keeps for herself (private
good), gk
i 2 [0;10] for k = fN;Lg is the number of tokens player i contributes to the





j for j 6= i is the sum of the
contributions of the other members of the group. xi and gk
i are positive integers.
In a second independent decision, Decision W, subjects chose how much to allocate
among their "personal" account, the "local" account and the "world" account. The
structure of incentives in Decision W was exactly the same as that in Decision N (i.e.
￿ = 1 > ￿
L = 0:5 > ￿
N = ￿
W = 0:25) and only the composition of the group
di⁄ered. The "world" group was made up of the subject, three "local" people - plus
eight anonymous subjects from di⁄erent countries around the "world." Subjects were
not told which countries these other subjects were from, but were informed that these
countries could be from any of the four continents where the research was conducted.10
Therefore, the payo⁄ for individual i in decision W was:
￿
W
i (xi;G) = ￿xi + ￿G = ￿(10 ￿ g
L+W











Both decisions, N and W, characterize a multilevel public good dilemma. It is
individually optimal to contribute nothing to the ￿collective￿accounts (￿ > ￿
k;k =
fN;L;Wg) although this goes against the social welfare of the group. In other words,
the Nash equilibrium of this game is Pareto sub-optimal. These two decisions aim
to mimic a situation in which the person has to decide wether to contribute to a
local public good and/or national public good (decision N) and to a local and/or global
10Due to the logistic of research, it was impossible to run the experiments simultaneously within
a single country. We had to rely on a ￿ dynamic￿matching procedure. For information about this
and other particularities of the macro experiment, please refer to Buchan et al. (2009).
7public good (decision W). The structure of incentives in both decisions is identical,
the only change being the nationality of the co-members of the ￿collective￿accounts.
This feature allows us to identify, among other things, how the identity of the people
eventually a⁄ects people￿ s cooperation directly or/and mediates the e⁄ect of individ-
ual aspirations on the propensity to cooperate. In order to maximize the validity of
our results, we controlled for the subjects understanding of the incentives and rules
of the game.11
3.2 Data
The dependent variable, "propensity to cooperate," is measured by individual con-
tributions to the ￿collective￿ accounts. The independent variables come from an
individual survey that participants completed at the end of the experiment.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables12
mean sd. max. min. N
Total Cont. (N) 7.32 2.67 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "local" Account (N) 3.10 2.01 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "national" Account 4.22 2.65 10.00 0.00 201
Total Cont. (W) 7.02 2.72 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "local" Account (W) 3.22 2.37 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "world" Account 3.81 2.84 10.00 0.00 201
On average, participants contributed at very high levels in both decisions. More
than 70% (in decisions N and W) of people￿ s endowments were allocated to their
￿collective￿ accounts. Even though the material incentives in Decision N and W
are exactly the same, contributions to the "world" account were signi￿cantly lower13
than contributions to the "national" account.14 As shown in Table 2, only 6% of
the participants contributed nothing at least once to the ￿collective￿accounts. More
11Built into the experiment instructions there was a basic understanding check, in which subjects
were asked to answer some questions about the interaction. This gave us the chance to check for
subjects￿comprehension of the task. Subjects (6 out of 207 subjects) who showed evident failures
to understand the task have been expunged from the dataset.
12Note: Total Cont. N and W stands for Total contributions to the collective accounts in Decisions
N and W, respectively.
13t = 1:5231;Pr(T > t) = 0:0643
14However, as expected, no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the average contribution in Decision N
and W was found (t = ￿1:1097; Pr(jTj > jtj) = 0:2678).
8than 25% of the people contributed all their tokens to some ￿collective￿account, in
at least one decision, and just 3.5% of the participants played their dominant strategy
(no contribution in any decision). Moreover, 65% (dec. N) and 69% (dec. W) of the
participants played interior solutions, i.e. they split their endowments.
Table 2: Frequency of Overall Contributions












Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in this
analysis.
Income is measured with the following question:
￿Below you will ￿nd a scale of monthly income:15
$5- $350- $500- $700- $851- $1051- $1300- $1621- $2100- $3000-
$350 $500 $700 $850 $1050 $1300 $1620 $2100 $3000 $108000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I would like to know which bracket your family belongs to, including
wages, salaries, pensions, and other income. Check the income bracket
that corresponds to your family, before taxes and other deductions.￿
Following Ray (2006), the variable Income Aspirations Gap - denoted by "gi"- is
de￿ned as the relative di⁄erence between the standard of living that is aspired to -
measured by the variable Absolute Aspirations Level and denoted by "ai"- and the
15This scale corresponds to the Argentine total household monthly income distribution by deciles



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10standard of living subjects already have - measured by the variable Income denoted





Information about Absolute Aspirations Level, ai; is gathered by asking subjects the
following question:
￿Consider the following scale of monthly income, [which is the same
as the one above] how much monthly income would your household need
to be satis￿ed? Check the income bracket that corresponds to that level
of income.￿
Thus, the maximum level of income aspirations gap that a person can have is
￿ gi(ai;si) ￿ 10￿1
10 = 0:9 and the minimum level is gi(ai;si) ￿ 1￿10
1 = ￿9. We allow for
negative income aspirations gap because, although highly unlikely, it is possible that
people may be satis￿ed with less income than that which they actually have. This
was indeed the case with some participants distributed across the four locations16.
A person characterized by ￿ gi(ai;si) is said to be ￿fully unsatis￿ed￿income-wise: she
belongs to the 1st decile of the population but aspires to be in the 10th decile. On the
contrary, someone with a gi(ai;si) ￿ 0 is said to be "fully satis￿ed" income-wise. We
interpret gi(ai;si_ ) > 0 as a measure of how frustrated the person is with the income
of his household.
During the analysis, other sets of variables were used to capture di⁄erent aspects
that may either a⁄ect individual propensity to cooperate, or mediate/moderate the
in￿ uence of income aspirations gap on it.
Income aspirations gaps may be highly correlated with life satisfaction. In order
to eliminate this source of omitted variable bias, participants were asked the standard
question used in the subjective well-being literature:
￿Overall, how satis￿ed are you with your life?17
Likewise, the motivations that people may have to cooperate with their compatri-
ots or neighbours may be di⁄erent from the motivations to cooperate with a foreigner.
We collected information on individual degree of identi￿cation (social identity) with
16The minimum g of our database was ￿1; and it is highly unlikely to have cases of aspirations
gap less than this value.
17(1=very unsatis￿ed; 2=somewhat satis￿ed; 3=somewhat unsatis￿ed; 4=very satis￿ed)
11people from their neighbourhood, Argentina and the rest of the "world" (Yuki et al.,
2005, see), with questions such us:
￿to what degree do you feel committed to your "neighbourhood, "Ar-
gentina" and the "rest of the world"?; to what degree do you see yourself as
part of your "neighbourhood," "Argentina" and the "rest of the world"?,
how close do you feel to the other members of ...?￿ 18
In addition, a question aiming to get an approximate measure of people￿ s percep-
tions of their own income relative to the income of the average recipient of the public
good was asked. The question was as follows:
"could you please indicate in which position you think the income of
your household is with respect to the average income of a household of
"your neighbourhood", "Argentina" and the "rest of the world".19
Finally, questions on Gender, (1=Masculine or 2=Feminine) and Education (1=El-
ementary School, 2=High School, 3=Tertiary, 4=University, 5=Masters, 6-Ph.D.)
were included in the survey.
3.3 Estimation
Ordered Logit estimations were used to estimate whether - and eventually how - peo-
ple￿ s income aspirations gaps a⁄ect their propensity to cooperate, ceteris paribus. An
ordinal regression model was chosen to allow the distances between categories (i.e.
numbers of tokens allocated to di⁄erent accounts) to di⁄er.20 One single regression
for each decision was carried out. The underlying latent variable was the individ-
ual propensity to cooperate with each of the three groups: "local," "national" and
"global" (k = L;N;W).
The model estimated is as follows:
g
k￿
i = ￿1gapi + ￿2Si + ￿3Ri + ￿4(gapi ￿ Ri) + x
0
i￿ + "i (4)
18Responses were indicated on 4-point scale from "not at all " to "very or a lot."
19The options were: 1- Very below average, 2- fairly below average, 3- aprox. same as average, 4-
fairly above average, 5- very above average.
20We performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test on all the regressions in this paper to test the propor-
tional odds assumption. It turns out that in most of the cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that that there is no di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients. So, given that in almost all the cases the pro-
portional odds assumption holds, for simplicity we preferred to present the results using a standard
rather a generalized ordinal regression model.
12where gapi is income aspirations gaps, Si is social identity, Ri is perceptions of
relative income, xi is a vector of control variables including demographic variables,
absolute income, and absolute aspirations, social capital, among others. gk￿
i is a
continuos unobserved number form 0 to 10 representing the propensity to contribute
to k account. It is measured in 10 "m" discrete intervals by the number of tokens
each people allocate to each k account. It is assumed that
g
k
i = m if ￿m￿1 ￿ g
k￿
i < ￿m; for m = 0;:::;10
The probability of contributing gi = m number of tokens to the k = fL;N;Wg
account was estimated for a given vector of exogenous variables x and assuming that
"i follows a logistic distribution.
4 Results
Table 4 summarizes the ￿rst results. Income aspirations gap is found to signi￿-
cantly reduce people￿ s propensity to cooperate with foreigners and compatriots, ceteris
paribus. However, it does not a⁄ect people￿ s propensity to cooperate with neighbours.
There are several possible reasons for this, which we discuss later in the article.
A natural question that arises is whether it is the gap that matters, or it is simply
income or/and absolute aspirations levels which a⁄ect cooperation. This concern is
addressed by including both variables, income and aspirations, as regressors. Table
4 con￿rms that income aspirations gap remains highly signi￿cant at the "world"
and "national" levels after controlling for absolute income, aspirations and other
demographic variables such us location dummies and gender, age and education.
Moreover, absolute aspirations levels and absolute income levels are found to be
statistically insigni￿cant: it is the gap instead of the absolute income or aspirations
per se that matters for cooperation with foreigners and compatriots. The quantitative
e⁄ect of this result is considerably high. Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the predicted
probabilities of being a free-rider or a fully cooperator with foreigners conditional
on income aspirations gap, ceteris paribus. The probability of contributing nothing
to the "world" account is 9.11% if income aspirations gap is g = 0; and it is 55.5%
if income aspirations gap is wide, i.e. g = 0:8 (see Figure 2). Figure 1 shows the
probability of contributing all the endowments to the "world" account conditional on
income aspirations gap. This probability is 12.8% if income aspirations gap is g = 0;




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Predicted probability of Contributing 100% of the endowments to the Global Public




































































































































a function of income aspirations gap is 0.38. This marginal probability is the slope
of the curve that associates income aspirations gap with the probability of being a
100% free-rider (Figure 2) evaluated at the mean of the income aspirations gap (0.16),
holding all the other variables constant at their mean level. Intuitively, if the income
aspirations gap of an average person increases by 1 percentual point, the probability
that she/he will free-ride on foreigners increases by 0.38 percentual points.
We now take advantage of the richness of our survey data to make sure that
our results are not spurious, and they are not driven by some confounding variable.
The results of such analysis are depicted in Table 5. The ￿rst potential confounding
variable included in the regression is "life satisfaction". We show that the inclusion
of this variable does not a⁄ect our main results.
Another possible source of confound is the social identi￿cation of participants with
neighbours, compatriots and foreigners. As pointed out in the literature (Brewer,
1981; Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Schopler and Insko, 1992; Akerlof and Kranton,
2000), social identi￿cation increases cooperation by reducing actors￿tendency to draw
distinctions between their own and others￿welfare. This would imply that the closer
people feel they are to their neighbour, compatriot or foreign fellow, the higher the
number of tokens contributed to the local, national or global account, respectively. It
is also known from the sociological literature (Appadurai, 2004; Sewell et al., 1957)
that individuals draw their aspirations from those who they feel identi￿ed with Ray











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Predicted probability of being a 100% free-rider with foreigners as a function of



































































































































world) but our main results on aspirations gap and cooperation don￿ t change. More-
over, our data con￿rm a positive e⁄ect of social identity on cooperation at "local" and
"world" level, but not at "national" level. The probability that a person who doesn￿ t
feel identi￿ed with foreigners (i.e. social identity index at "world" level equals cero)
fully cooperates with them is 14:4%;ceteris paribus. If the person feels identi￿ed with
the foreigner the probability that she/he fully cooperates increases to 36:3%: The
fact that social identi￿cation with compatriots does not a⁄ect people￿ s propensity to
cooperate with them is at least puzzling. One possibility is that identity increases
cooperation with ingroup members by in￿ uencing actors￿expectations about fellow
ingroup members￿behavior Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000). That is, social identity
alone is not su¢ cient to produce in-group favoritism. Group boundaries do not a⁄ect
cooperation if actors have a more direct basis for forming expectations that others
will reciprocate. In light of this argument, it may be the case that Argentineans,
regardless of how closely identi￿ed they felt with their compatriots, expected less
favourable treatment from their compatriots in return. The role of expectations is
con￿rmed when expectations about others￿contributions (at all levels) were added to
the regression. As can be observed from Table 6, there is a clear strong relationship
between the player￿ s level of cooperation and the expectations of the level of the av-
erage partner￿ s cooperativeness. However, social identity remain highly signi￿cant at
"world" and "local" level, suggesting that Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) hypothesis
is only con￿rmed at "national" level. At the other levels, the hypothesis that social
identity alone is not su¢ cient to produce in-group favoritism cannot be rejected.
17The last potential confounding variable we investigate is players￿perceptions of
their own income relative to the income of the average recipient of the public good.
The e⁄ect of distributive justice principles on cooperation have been studied in the
Social Psychology literature. Lamm and Schwinger (1980), for example, show empir-
ical evidence that people contribute unequally in favor of the needier person. The
richer people perceive themselves relative to their neighbour, compatriot or foreign
fellow, the higher will be their contribution to the local, national or global account,
respectively. In the economic literature, a similar version of this hypothesis has been
put forward by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who suggested that some people may be
inequity averse and may be willing to sacri￿ce their own payo⁄ in order to minimize
disparities between own and others payo⁄s. However, what we do here is somehow
di⁄erent. In the experiment reported in this article, people come to the laboratory
with (a) a particular real income situation and (b) a particular perception of their in-
come relative to the income of the average neighbour, compatriot or foreigner. Thus,
if perceived real relative disadvantage a⁄ect the behaviour in the lab, then we are
saying that an "inequality averse" rich person will cooperate with a poor person, but
may not cooperate with a "rich" person. According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
however, this "inequality averse" person will cooperate in the same way in both ex-
periments, because people￿ s perceptions about their income relative to the others does
not play a role in their model. Thus, in the light of their model, the same person will
be thought to be pure altruistic in the ￿rst experiment, and pure inequality averse in
the second. We don￿ t ￿nd enough evidence in favour of inequality averse people and
our main results on aspiration gap and cooperation remain robust after the inclusion
of these variables.
Finally we test for the existence of an interaction e⁄ect. We want to investigate
whether players￿perception of their relative income w.t. the income of the aver-
age recipient of the public good moderates the e⁄ect of income aspirations gap on
contributions. We expect that the (negative) e⁄ect of income aspirations gap on co-
operation is lower (less negative) if the person perceives that her income is higher
than the income of the average recipient of the public good. After including the
interaction term in the four regressions, this interaction e⁄ect was found to be di⁄er-
ent, depending on the identity of the recipients of the public good. The coe¢ cient
measuring the interaction is negative and highly signi￿cant, only when the recipients
of the public good are neighbours. It is positive and signi￿cant when the recipients
of the public good are foreigners, and it is not signi￿cant when they are compatri-
ots. These observations immediately highlight the complexity of human cooperation.
18Players￿perception of their relative income w.t. the income of the average recipient
of the public good reduces the e⁄ect of Income Aspirations Gap on contributions with
their neighbours, and increases the e⁄ect of Income aspirations Gap on contributions
with foreigners, although it does not a⁄ect the e⁄ect of income aspiration gaps on
cooperation with compatriots.
5 Robustness checks
The most important threats to internal validity are (a) errors-in-variables bias, (b)
simultaneous causality bias and (c) omitted variable bias from a variable that is
correlated with the regressors but is unobserved. This latter source of threat has
been extensively considered in the preceding section. Thus, this section will focus on
exploring the eventual in￿ uence of threats (a) and (b) on the results. In addition,
model speci￿cation and concerns related to the (small) size of the sample used for
estimations are also discussed.
Arguably, one of the main variables of this study, income aspirations gaps, may
su⁄er from measurement error. Unfortunately, due to the lack of empirical work on
income aspirations gaps, there is no other existing measure to contrast with. The
closest one is an aspirations/attainment measure used by Easterlin (2003), who took
information from a representative survey21 of the American population that included
the following two questions:
"1. We often hear people talk about what they want out of life. Here
are a number of di⁄erent things. [The respondent is handed a card with
a list of 24 items.] When you think of the good life ￿the life you￿ d like
to have, which of the things on this list, if any, are part of that good life
as far as you personally are concerned? 2. "Now would you go down that
list and call o⁄ all the things you now have?"
The idea behind these two questions is similar to the idea used to measure income
aspirations gap in this article. The ￿rst question gathers information about desires
for certain goods, which can be summarized here as desires for a certain income
level. The second question tries to capture the place in which the respondents stand
in relation to these desires, i.e. to what extent they are ful￿lled. This question
is analogous to the question on current income made here. So, the only existing
21These surveys are used in Schor (1998)
19measure of "aspirations gaps" is not far from the one used here. Notwithstanding
this, the measure used here is subject to another concern. The income aspirations
people are asked to comment on are not absolute values, but relative to the income
distribution in Argentina. People are asked to state in which position of the income
distribution of their country they would be satis￿ed. Thus, the variable income
aspiration is speci￿cally measuring relative income aspirations. This approach has
its positive and negative sides. On the positive side, it is perfectly in line with the
"relative income hypothesis" ￿rst formulated by Duesenberry (1949). According to
this, people essentially care about their relative position rather than their income in
absolute terms (see Zizzo and Oswald, 2001). People set their standards relative to
the standards of others. On the negative side, such a measure imposes an eventual
arti￿cial upper bound on people￿ s aspirations. A person who is already in the highest
decile of the income distribution is not allowed to aspire more than this. In order
to reduce this measurement error, all the regressions conducted in this study where
replicated dropping from the entire sample those subjects who belonged to the highest
decile. Table 6 shows that the results remain qualitatively the same and, moreover,
the coe¢ cient of income aspirations gap even become more signi￿cant. Likewise,
some variables that were not signi￿cant before (e.g. income, absolute aspirations and
life satisfaction at the national level), now became signi￿cant.
One of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regressions is that the rela-
tionship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. In other words, ordinal
logistic regression assumes that the coe¢ cients that describe the relationship between,
say, the lowest versus all higher categories of the response variable are the same as
those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher
categories, etc. This is called the proportional odds assumption. Because the rela-
tionship between all pairs of groups is the same, there is only one set of coe¢ cients
(only one model). If this was not the case, we would need di⁄erent models to describe
the relationship between each pair of outcome groups. We test the proportional odds
assumption, and we use a Log Likelihood ratio test 22. In the ￿rst two models of
Table 5 we found not enough evidence to reject the assumption of proportional odds
(model column 1: chi2(136) = 147:65 and Prob > chi2 = 0:2334; model column 2:
chi2(153) = 163:48 and Prob > chi2 = 0:2664). In the last two models (col. 3 and 4)
the test rejects the null hypothesis at low signi￿cance levels, therefore only for these
last two models, there is su¢ cient evidence that the proportional odds assumption
does not hold. However, this is not a major concern since the main results of this































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21article come from model 1 and 2 in which the assumption of proportional odds ratio
is not rejected.
Before concluding, it is natural to comment on the size of the sample used in
this article. As an estimation method, ordered Logit uses Maximum Likelihood (ML)
Estimation. The ML estimators become minimum variance unbiased estimators as
the sample size tends to in￿nite or it is large enough. Therefore, the ML estimation
may be biased and inferential hypothesis tests are uncertain in small sample analyses.
Hart and Clark (1999) explore the behavior of ML estimates in probit models across
di⁄ering sample sizes and with varying numbers of independent variables in Monte
Carlo simulations. Their experiments show that (a) the risk of making Type I errors
does not change appreciably as sample size descends and (b) the risk of making Type
II errors increases dramatically in smaller samples and as the number of regressors
increases. These results strengthen the validity of the results shown in this article.
In the analysis made here, the statistical signi￿cance of a coe¢ cient is tested and the
null hypothesis is that the coe¢ cient are equal to zero. If the risk of "rejecting a
null hypothesis when it is actually true" does not change considerably as sample size
decreases, then we would expect that those coe¢ cients that are signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero in this article will remain being di⁄erent from zero if we increased the
sample size. It is certainly true, however, that we do not know if some variables
that are not statistically signi￿cant with the sample size used here, would become
statistical signi￿cant if largest sample size is used.
6 Conclusion
Theories of aspirations have been applied to a broad array of issues across the so-
cial sciences, including Economics, Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Decision
Theory. Since its inclusion in Economics in the early ￿fties by Simon (1955, 1959),
no systematic work has been carried out to learn about the implications of income
aspirations on cooperation, particularly in a one shot public good setting. This article
is the ￿rst attempt to do so.
It has been shown that the narrower an individual￿ s income aspirations gap, the
greater is the propensity to cooperate providing both global and national public goods.
However, this e⁄ect was not signi￿cant in the provision of a local public good. It is
the gap that matters, instead of the absolute income or aspirations. The quantitative
e⁄ect is considerably high. Participants with the widest aspirations gap were 46
percent more likely to free-ride on foreigners than those who were fully satis￿ed with
22their income. We found a parallel result suggesting that the e⁄ect of social identity
on cooperation depends on the geographical level of the public good provided. The
more participants feel identi￿ed with foreigners or neighbours, the higher is their
contribution levels to providing a global and local public good. In-group identi￿cation
with compatriots does not a⁄ect participants￿contributions to provide a national
public good, ceteris paribus.
We have made three contributions to the economics literature. First, our results
have important implications for the existing knowledge of private provision of public
goods, initiated with Bergstrom et al. (1986) in￿ uential paper. Bergstrom et al.
(1986) state that any change in the wealth distribution that leaves unchanged the
aggregate wealth of current contributors will either increase or leave unchanged the
equilibrium supply of public good. This statement may not hold if changes in the
wealth distribution have a non-linear e⁄ect on people￿ s cooperation through its change
in income aspirations gap.
Second, we showed evidence that the motivations to contribute and the level of
contributions depend on the geographical type of the public good in question. This
has practical implications for regional public policies and raises some challenges for
the design of policies aiming at increasing private contributions to public goods. For
example, a policy that promotes in-group identi￿cation will increase cooperation at a
local level but not at a national level. However, a policy aimed at reducing individuals￿
income aspirations gap will be more e⁄ective at increasing both national and global
cooperation than local cooperation. In this latter case, one should be cautious, since
reducing individual￿ s income aspirations can, on the one hand, increase social welfare
by increasing cooperation, but on the other hand, it can reduce social welfare through
the e⁄ect on growth.
Third, the evidence presented here highlights a previously ￿unobserved￿source of
the individual heterogeneity identi￿ed in most public good experiments. Taking the
example given in the introduction, if an econometrician does not control for John￿ s
unsatis￿ed income aspirations, then his behaviour in both scenarios will be inferred to
be irrational or inconsistent, when in fact it is simple the case of an omitted variable
bias.
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